

STATSPRO

Approved For Release 1999/03/24 : CIA-RDP85-00630R00040025-1

#27-11

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
CONF

1 OF 1

8 JULY 1971

Doc/SER

Confidential



TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential

8 JULY 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 27)

CONFIDENTIAL

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

12 July 1971

C O R R E C T I O N

FBIS TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA, 8 July 1971, Indochina section, page nine:

In the article "Peking Welcomes PRG Proposal With PEOPLE'S DAILY Editorial," the second paragraph should read: Peking did not mention the NFLSV/PRG 10-point proposal of 8 May 1969 until early October of that year. It acknowledged the substance of the eight-point "elaboration" of 17 September 1970 belatedly in mid-October, in the course of reporting remarks by a PRG spokesman. Peking's first endorsement of the NFLSV/PRG peace plans appeared in the 13 December 1970 party-government statement supporting Hanoi's unprecedented party-government appeal for vigilance issued three days earlier. The proposals were also endorsed by both sides in the 8 March 1971 joint communique on Chou En-lai's visit to Hanoi.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

8 JULY 1971

CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention	i
INDOCHINA	
New PRG Proposal Updates May 1969, September 1970 Peace Plans . . .	1
Account of Paris Session Highlights Xuan Thuy's Endorsement . . .	5
Hanoi, PRG Media Press Proposal, Attack Nixon Policy.	6
Peking Welcomes PRG Proposal With PEOPLE'S DAILY Editorial. . . .	9
Moscow Stresses Positive Reaction to Plan Among U.S. Public . . .	11
Moscow Continues Comment on Pentagon Papers, Attacks on PRC . . .	13
DRV Spokesman, Comment Score U.S. Strikes Against North	14
Pathet Lao's Latest Peace Proposal Gets Further Publicity	15
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS	
Major PRAVDA Article Proposes New Sino-Soviet Border Treaty . . .	16
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT	
PRC Renews World Conference Bid as USSR Presses Own Proposal. . .	22
SALT: PRAVDA Attacks U.S. Opponents of Arms Limitation	24
MIDDLE EAST	
Communique on Riyadh Visit Supports UAR Views on Suez Issue. . . .	27
Moscow Publicizes Ratification of UAR-Soviet Treaty	30
"Bergus Memo," Helms Trip Seen as Evidence of U.S. Duplicity. . .	32
INDONESIA	
Moscow Broadcasts in Indonesian Denounce Election "Farce"	35
Soviet Comment Presses for Broad Communist-Led United Front . . .	37
PRC-JAPAN	
Communique Defines Issues Dividing Peking and Tokyo	39
KOREA	
PRC, DPRK Stress Asian Unity on Korean War Anniversary.	41
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS	
CCP 50th Anniversary: History Retold, Celebrations Low-Keyed . .	46

(Continued)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

8 JULY 1971

C O N T E N T S (Continued)

USSR-ROMANIA

Moscow Stresses Bucharest's Commitments to Soviet Bloc	49
IZVESTIYA Argues For Coordinated Bloc Foreign Policy	50

WARSAW PACT

Media Publicize Exercises in Poland, Czechoslovakia, GDR	52
--	----

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS TREND.]

8 JULY 1971

- i -

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 28 JUNE - 4 JULY 1971

Moscow (2989 items)

Soyuz XI & Salyut	(10%)	23%
[Cosmonauts' Death	(--)	20%]
Ratification of UAR-	(1%)	8%
USSR Treaty & Foreign		
Minister Riyadh's Visit		
Indochina	(11%)	7%
["Pentagon Documents"	(8%)	3%]
[PRG Seven-Point	(--)	2%]
Proposal		
China	(3%)	7%
[CCP Anniversary	(--)	5%]
Soviet Writers' Congress	(--)	7%
Soviet Proposal on	(8%)	2%
5-Power Nuclear		
Conference		

Peking (997 items)

Domestic Issues	(42%)	35%
CCP 50th Anniversary	(1%)	29%
[Foreign Greetings	(--)	14%]
& Observances		
[Joint Editorial	(--)	13%]
Article		
Indochina	(7%)	7%
[PRG Seven-Point	(--)	4%]
Proposal		
Taiwan Anniversary	(1%)	5%
Canadian Economic	(--)	3%
Delegation in PRC		
Japanese Komeido	(--)	2%
Party Delegation		
in PRC		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1971

- 1 -

INDOCHINA

Vietnamese communist media highlight the PRG's "new initiative" calling on the United States to set a terminal date for withdrawal from South Vietnam in 1971 and proposing that all captured military and civilian personnel be released simultaneously with total withdrawal. The seven-point proposal introduced at Paris on 1 July parallels in many respects the PRG's 17 September 1970 eight-point "elaboration" of the NFISV's 10-point solution of 8 May 1969. However, the second point on political settlement in South Vietnam notably singles out for attack only President Thieu--rather than the "Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique"--in reiterating that there must be a "new Saigon administration" which would hold talks with the PRG. The proposal also studiously avoids the term "coalition" government, referring instead to a "broad three-segment government of national concord" which would be set up following the talks between the PRG and a new Saigon administration.

Followup Vietnamese communist propaganda on the proposal stresses favorable world and U.S. public reaction and suggests that this has put the Nixon Administration into an increasingly isolated position. A 3 July Observer article in the party paper NHAN DAN says the seven-point proposal gives the United States the choice of "withdrawing in safety and honor or stubbornly continuing the aggressive war and suffering inevitable final defeat."

In striking contrast to Peking's coolness toward earlier peace proposals, PRC media promptly carried a virtual text of the PRG statement and followed up with a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 4th expressing the "firm support" of the Chinese Government and people "for the just stand and reasonable proposal of the Vietnamese people."

Moscow as usual reported the PRG proposal promptly and praised it in followup comment, including a 5 July PRAVDA editorial, as a basis on which to get the Paris talks out of the "impasse" and open the way for a political settlement. Commentators contrast the "skepticism" with which the Nixon Administration has received the proposal with statements by Congressional leaders, in the U.S. press, and by other spokesmen calling on the Administration not to pass up the opportunity to end U.S. involvement in Indochina.

NEW PRG PROPOSAL UPDATES MAY 1969, SEPTEMBER 1970 PEACE PLANS

Hanoi has handled the PRG proposal as it did the NFISV/PRG's other major proposals at Paris. VNA, the radio, and the press departed

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1971

- 2 -

from the standard practice of covering the Paris sessions with only summary accounts: As in publicizing the 1969 and 1970 proposals, VNA followed its normal summary of the 1 July session immediately with transmission of the full text of both PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh's and DRV delegate Xuan Thuy's speeches. On 2 July the texts of the speeches were broadcast by both Hanoi and Liberation Radio and published in the Hanoi press.

There is more extensive followup comment than last September, with articles in both the party organ NHAN DAN and the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN as well as routine radio talks. However, in line with general practice, communist media do not report the post-session briefings. Last September, in a rare move, VNA had reported some of the DRV and PRG spokesmen's remarks. The media to date have also ignored Mme. Binh's remarks to UPI on the proposals and Le Duc Tho's interview with the New York TIMES' Anthony Lewis. (Le Duc Tho had granted an interview to Murray Marder of the Washington POST on 22 June 1969--in the wake of the 9 May 1969 PRG proposal and President Nixon's proposal of 14 May.)

TROOP WITHDRAWALS & RELEASE OF PRISONERS

The PRG's call on the United States to set a terminal date for troop withdrawal dates back to December 1969, when the PRG at Paris proposed that if the United States agreed to withdraw in six months there could be discussions on insuring the safety of the withdrawing troops. That call was repeated periodically during the next nine months--up until the release of the PRG's 17 September 1970 eight-point initiative.* Point one of the proposal last September paralleled the December 1969 call for troop withdrawal but set the time period nine months hence--30 June 1971--and added the new element that once the United States agreed to a timetable the question of the release of POW's could be "discussed" immediately. Recurrently since last September, the communists have suggested that if the 30 June date was not regarded as suitable, the United States should pick another reasonable date. The suggestion of an alternative date was raised with greater frequency as the 30 June deadline approached. And it was logical with the passing of that deadline that the PRG should set a new one.

* For a discussion of the September proposals and comparison with the May 1969 10-point solution, see the TRENDS of 23 September 1970, pages 1-6.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1971

- 3 -

Much of the language of point one of the current proposal is identical with point one of the September proposal in calling for unconditional withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops and materiel from South Vietnam and the dismantling of U.S. bases there. However, it differs from the September proposal in saying that given a terminal date, the parties "will agree on the modalities"--rather than "hold discussions"--on the safety of withdrawing troops and the release of prisoners. And where the September proposal referred to the question of the release of captured military men, the current one speaks of the release of "military men of all parties and of the civilians captured in the war." The current proposal also specifies that the withdrawals and prisoner release "will begin on the same date and end on the same date."

Point one concludes with the declaration--introduced in a supplementary statement by the PRG's Mme. Binh at Paris on 10 December 1970--that a cease-fire will be observed between the PLAF and the United States and its foreign allies as soon as agreement is reached on total withdrawal.

SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM Point two of the current proposal deals with a political settlement and is titled "the question of power in South Vietnam." Point two in the September proposal was on the question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam; that issue reverts to point three in the current proposal--its position in the original 8 May 1969 10 points. In the September proposal the issue of a political settlement was discussed in points three, four, and five. The equivalent discussion in point two of the latest proposal is notable for its failure to repeat the usual diatribes against the Thieu-Ky-Khiem "clique" and the September formulation that an administration excluding all three must be formed. The current proposal says the United States "must cease backing the bellicose group headed by Nguyen Van Thieu at present in office in Saigon" And it goes on to say only that "the political, social, and religious forces in South Vietnam aspiring to peace and national concord will use various means to form a new administration favoring peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy."

The new proposal also avoids the term "coalition" government when it says that the first question to be settled by talks between the PRG and a new Saigon administration is the formation of "a broad, three-segment government of national concord" that

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1971

- 4 -

will assume its functions during the period between the restoration of peace and the holding of general elections. The September proposal had specified that a provisional coalition government would include three components: persons from the PRG, from the Saigon administration--"those really standing for peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy"--and from various political and religious forces and tendencies standing for these same goals.

Point two of the current proposal says that as soon as a "government of national concord" is established, a cease-fire will be observed between the PLAF and Saigon forces. As in the case of a U.S.-PLAF cease-fire, this assertion had its origin in Mme. Binh's supplementary statement at the 10 December Paris session. That statement had said that a cease-fire would be observed after the PRG and a Saigon administration "without Thieu, Ky, and Khiem" agree "on the formation of a provisional coalition government composed of three segments . . ." as provided in the 17 September 1970 PRG statement.* Point two says that in addition to settling the question of the government of national concord, the talks between the PRG and the new Saigon administration will be aimed at prohibiting reprisals against collaborators of either side, insuring democratic liberties, and releasing political prisoners; social and economic reconstruction; and agreement on measures to insure the holding of democratic, general elections.

SOUTH VIETNAM RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

Point four of the latest proposal discusses the question of relations between North and South Vietnam and eventual reunification, discussed in points seven and eight of the 8 May 1969 proposal and point six of the proposal of September 1970. The standard line that the two zones will reestablish normal relations pending unification is repeated, and the current proposal reiterates the proviso--separated out as point eight of the 10-points--that in keeping with the 1954 Geneva agreements provision, the two zones would refrain from joining any foreign military alliances or allowing foreign bases or troops.

* The September "elaboration" of the PRG position had dealt with the matter of a cease-fire in the eighth and final point: "After the agreement on and signing of accords aimed at putting an end to the war and restoring peace in Vietnam, the parties will implement the modalities that will have been laid down for a cease-fire."

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1971

- 5 -

Point five is on the foreign policy "of peace and neutrality" of South Vietnam and essentially repeats the provisions in the May 1969 proposal (point six). It says again that South Vietnam would establish relations with all countries including the United States, regardless of their regimes and on the basis of the five principles of coexistence, and that it would accept aid from any country if no conditions were attached. It adds a new element when it says that South Vietnam "will participate in regional plans of economic cooperation."

Point six says that the United States must "bear full responsibility for the losses and the destruction it has caused to the Vietnamese people in the two zones." In the 10-point solution this was included under point nine on "aftermath of the war," which also provided that the parties would negotiate the release of military prisoners.

Point seven uses language identical with point seven of the September 1970 proposal when it says "the parties will find agreement on the forms of respect and international guarantee of the accords that will be concluded."

ACCOUNT OF PARIS SESSION HIGHLIGHTS XUAN THUY'S ENDORSEMENT

In his formal statement at the Paris session Xuan Thuy declared the DRV's "full approval and support" of the PRG's seven-point proposal without repeating its specific details. Stressing communist efforts for a peaceful settlement, he recalled the DRV's four-point stand of April 1965 and the fact that the DRV had "wholeheartedly supported" the NFLSV's 10-point proposal of May 1969 and the PRG's eight- and three-point statements of September and December 1970.

Thuy reiterated the standard line that as long as the United States pursues its "aggression" the Vietnamese will continue their fight "until total victory." But he added that they do not like enmity and want to see "U.S. forces rapidly withdraw from South Vietnam in safety, so that every American serviceman participating in the war, including American pilots captured in North Vietnam, may promptly return to his home." He cited the Pentagon papers as proof that U.S. "pretexts" for entering the war "are utterly unjustified" and commented that therefore the United States cannot avoid total withdrawal.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

8 JULY 1971

- 6 -

Thuy echoed Mme. Binh in asking "the U.S. delegate" to "consider carefully the seven-point statement" and "give it a positive response." The VNA account of the session notes that Ambassador Bruce, "though promising to consider" the new initiative, "kept repeating Nixon's words proving that the United States still schemes to impose neocolonialism on South Vietnam."

VNA similarly notes that "the Saigon puppet administration's delegate also promised to consider the proposal, but in his prepared speech as well as his further comment he repeated Nixon's and Nguyen Van Thieu's erroneous allegations." The account says Mme. Binh, "speaking again," emphasized that the U.S. delegation "should consider carefully and respond positively to the above seven-point statement." (In September the VNA account did not carry the remarks by the allied delegates on the PRG's eight points. But accounts of the post-session briefings, which VNA did carry, reported some of their comments.)

HANOI, PRG MEDIA PRESS PROPOSAL, ATTACK NIXON POLICY

HANOI Vietnamese communist propaganda portrays U.S. public reaction to the proposal as favorable and says this has prevented the Administration from rejecting it out of hand. Hanoi radio reported foreign reaction promptly on 2 July, and on the 3d there was original comment from the radio, a NHAN DAN Observer (Nguoi Quan Sat) article carried by both Hanoi radio and VNA, and a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Commentator (Nguoi Binh Luan) article. There was additional radio comment on the 4th and 6th.

The NHAN DAN Observer article of the 3d amounts to a detailed recapitulation of Hanoi's standard line on the Administration's Indochina policy. The article says Vietnamization can neither end the war nor U.S. participation in the war, but rather is a policy aimed at prolonging the U.S. presence. Observer claims that while the President pictures troop withdrawal as evidence of U.S. good will, in fact he was forced to withdraw some U.S. troops to assuage opponents of the war and to ease the economic burden. Obscuring the fact that the President had advanced a five-point peace proposal on 7 October, Observer says the Nixon Administration's "stubborn stand" is clearly reflected in its proposals on two basic problems--U.S. troop withdrawal and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination. The article goes on to denounce the demand for a bilateral troop

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1971

- 7 -

withdrawal and U.S. backing for the Saigon government. It also typically scores the President's avowed intent to remain until all U.S. POWs are released and the Thieu administration is strong enough to cope with the war.

A 3 July radio commentary recalls that the 8 May 1969 10-point proposal had specified that the U.S. Government must withdraw from South Vietnam all U.S. and foreign troops and war materiel without posing any conditions, and it notes that President Nixon has persistently refused to set a deadline. It also denounces the President's efforts to relate a U.S. withdrawal to the demand for U.S. prisoner release and "maintenance of the U.S.-sponsored puppet regime in Saigon." It mentions that point one of the new proposal deals realistically with the problems of total withdrawal of U.S. troops and the release of U.S. servicemen captured in Vietnam. "Let us see," it says, "whether Nixon will continue to use the U.S. POW problem as a pretext to dodge and ignore the American people's urgent demand for the fixing of a timetable for total withdrawal."

Both the NHAN DAN Observer article and the radio commentary spell out in full points one and two of the PRG proposal dealing with troop withdrawal and a political settlement in South Vietnam. But only NHAN DAN briefly lists the other five points. The 3 July QUA DOI NHAN DAN Commentator article, unlike the NHAN DAN article and the radio broadcast, does not specify any of the seven points. Taking a different tack, it says that in the present situation in Indochina and the United States--it cites such things as the early May antiwar demonstrations, the Senate passage on 22 June of the Mansfield amendment calling for withdrawal of U.S. troops in nine months, and "serious defeats" experienced by the allies throughout the Indochina theater--the new proposal "provides public opinion with a sharp weapon to continue the struggle to demand that Nixon respond to the pressing demands of the American and South Vietnamese peoples." The PRG initiative, it says, "compels Nixon to answer before public opinion the questions that he has in the recent past sought by every means to dodge or to deceitfully hide from the American people."

QUAN DOI NHAN DAN's Commentator takes note of Press Secretary Ziegler's remarks on the proposal, saying that while U.S. "progressives" and world public opinion were warmly welcoming the proposal, Ziegler commented that it had both positive and unacceptable elements and that the United States would not

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

8 JULY 1971

- 8 -

agree to arrangements that forsake the South Vietnamese citizens. The paper cites AFP for the comment that the Nixon Administration "pretended to respond favorably" to the new PRG initiative, a "gesture aimed at appeasing public opinion" and "not necessarily showing that Nixon is ready to negotiate a U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam." Scoring the President for "maintaining an aggressive stand and a very stubborn attitude" since he took office, it says "Thieu's warlike allegations--that he is against coalition and neutrality and is determined to win a military victory--obviously reflect Nixon's real stand." Ziegler's remarks on the proposal are almost uniformly noted in other Hanoi propaganda, most notably his reaffirmation that the South Vietnamese citizenry would not be abandoned.

Hanoi repeatedly cites favorable reaction to the proposal from senators, including McGovern, Muskie, Javits, and Hatfield, as well as from former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford and other opponents of the war including spokesmen for peace organizations.

THE FRONT Followup Liberation Front propaganda on the proposal is highlighted by NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho's Independence Day message to the American people in which he expressed the hope that they would support the new initiative and demand a serious response from their government. Tho's message and LPA and Liberation Radio commentaries stress the basic provisions in points one and two.

A 2 July LPA commentary and another from Liberation Radio on the 6th score the President for his "deceit" regarding the POW issue and self-determination of the South Vietnamese. Like Hanoi propaganda, both commentaries score Press Secretary Ziegler's statement that the United States would not agree to an arrangement that would abandon the South Vietnamese people; LPA says this simply means that the Administration does not want to give up "the warlike group headed by Thieu."

The radio commentary of the 6th says that with an eye to U.S. public opinion, the White House had to admit that the PRG proposal includes "a number of new and positive factors." On the 2d Liberation Radio cited AFP for the remark that a desire to appease public opinion was behind the haste shown by the White House to express a favorable reaction. But the broadcast also cited without comment AFP's observation that "the U.S. Administration may consider the fact that the Viet Cong is ready to release the prisoners of war at the same time

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1971

- 9 -

the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam is in process rather than waiting until the time when all U.S. troops are withdrawn." It went on to quote AFP as saying that the State Department "thought the PRG proposal may be used as a basis for negotiations," and it added that particularly with the proposal coming at the time Kissinger was going to Saigon, "the United States may reconsider its Indochina policy."

The 6 July LPA commentary contrasts favorable foreign reaction to the proposal with the reaction from Saigon. It says President Thieu "hurriedly ordered" the foreign ministry "to declare that 'there is nothing new' in this peace initiative and that 'it is unacceptable.'" Noting that Thieu said he would discuss the proposals with Kissinger, LPA goes on to suggest that Thieu "is waiting for his U.S. masters to put words into his mouth." The remainder of the broadcast deprecates Thieu, claiming that the people are struggling to overthrow his administration and oppose the fall election.

Liberation Radio on the 8th says world opinion believes the proposal has "opened new perspectives for the stalemated negotiations" and scores President Thieu for stating that it "contains nothing new." The radio cites REUTER as saying he continued "to call for war, asserting that there would not be a solution to the war before 1973."

PEKING WELCOMES PRG PROPOSAL WITH PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL

In contrast to its virtual ignoring of earlier PRG peace plans, Peking has given wide publicity to the 1 July proposal, with NCNA on the 3d transmitting a near text of Mme. Binh's statement at the Paris session. Prompt high-level endorsement comes in the widely broadcast 4 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial. Peking has also publicized Vietnamese commentaries on the proposal.

Peking did not mention the NFLSV/PRG 10-point proposal of 8 May 1969 until early October of that year, and it never directly endorsed that proposal. It acknowledged the substance of the eight-point "elaboration" of 17 September 1970 belatedly in mid-October, in the course of reporting remarks by a PRG spokesman.

While unequivocally endorsing the seven-point proposal, the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial stresses the first two points, relating to the total withdrawal of U.S. forces and to a

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

8 JULY 1971

- 10 -

political settlement in South Vietnam. It calls "entirely just and reasonable" the proposal's assertion that if the United States set a terminal date for withdrawal in 1971, "the parties will at the same time agree on the modalities" concerning a safe withdrawal and the release of both military and civilian POW's. It does not mention either the proposal's statement that the withdrawal of forces and the prisoner release "will begin on the same date and will end on the same date" or its provision on a cease-fire following an agreement.

PEOPLE'S DAILY does not discuss the details of the second point. It merely cites the proposal's demand that the United States end interference in South Vietnamese internal affairs and "cease backing the puppet regime headed by Nguyen Van Thieu." And it predicts that with U.S. nonintervention, "the various political forces in South Vietnam upholding national independence and loving peace will be able to reach unanimity of opinions on relevant questions through consultation."

The editorial concludes that the seven-point proposal "is another test for Nixon" and maintains that if he really wishes to end the war "he has no reason whatsoever to reject the seven-point proposal." It adds that while the U.S. effort is "doomed to failure" on Indochina battlefields, the "revolutionary" antiwar "mass movement . . . unfolded by the American people at home is mounting vigorously, reflecting their strong desire to end this dirty war immediately."

PENTAGON PAPERS The first known reference in Peking propaganda to the Pentagon papers came in NCNA's 3 July report of Xuan Thuy's statement at the Paris session, including his assertion that publication of the Pentagon documents in the U.S. press has proved that U.S. pretexts regarding U.S. intervention in Vietnam are entirely unjustified. Peking then referred on its own to the documents in the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 4th. Contending that "the total withdrawal of the U.S. aggressor troops and U.S. lackey troops" from South Vietnam is "crucial" to a settlement, the editorial declare that the U.S. Government's plotting, launching, and expanding of the war in Vietnam is "fully proved in the secret Pentagon report leaked recently."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

8 JULY 1971

- 11 -

MOSCOW STRESSES POSITIVE REACTION TO PLAN AMONG U.S. PUBLIC

TASS promptly reported the PRG's new proposal, and followup press and radio comment praises the initiative as a basis on which to get the Paris talks out of their "impasse." The propaganda is highlighted by a widely broadcast 5 July PRAVDA editorial* which routinely scores U.S. aggression and "crimes" in Indochina and expresses support for the peace programs put forward by the Laotians and Cambodians as well as the Vietnamese. The new PRG plan, PRAVDA says, offers a "good basis" to get the Paris conference out of the "impasse and opens the road for a political settlement in Vietnam and, in the final analysis, throughout Indochina." It claims that the new initiative has evoked a "wide positive reaction throughout the world."

Commenting on the first point of the program, Soltan observed in a foreign-language talk on 6 July that the United States has been stressing that the "main condition" for withdrawing troops is the release of American prisoners and that it doubts the PRG's "good will" on this issue. With the "explanation" on this point provided by the new initiative, Soltan said, this "pretext" under which the United States has refused to conduct "concrete talks" no longer exists and the PRG proposal is thus "a kind of test of the honesty and sincerity of the U.S. Government's intentions." Asserting, however, that there is no indication that the United States will "take advantage of the opportunity," he noted that U.S. spokesmen have called the proposals "unacceptable in their present form" and that Presidential Adviser Kissinger discussed Vietnamization with Saigon leaders. Several TASS reports give more balanced reports of the statements by White House and State Department spokesmen, noting that they said that the United States would consider the proposal although it contained obviously unacceptable elements as well as positive ones.

* This is the first PRAVDA editorial on Indochina since 9 February, when the paper editorially denounced U.S. escalation in Indochina. A PRAVDA Observer article greeted the NFLSV's 10 points in May 1969; the eight-point "elaboration" of 17 September 1970 drew only routine-level Soviet press and radio comment, although Podgorny briefly praised it in a 23 September luncheon speech for the visiting Indian president.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1971

- 12 -

Many Soviet commentaries say that pressure is being exerted on the Administration by Congressional and other antiwar spokesmen in the United States. A PRAVDA International Review on 4 July cited the New York TIMES' James Reston as saying that the furor over the Pentagon papers is symbolic of a national "split" over the war, and it quoted another observer as writing of the American people's "bitter" hostility to the war. The war, he says "is coming home to roost" and "new antiwar battles loom on the U.S. horizon."

A 3 July PRAVDA article said the PRG proposals "correspond to the aspirations of the broad U.S. public" and that these aspirations were particularly well reflected in the Mansfield amendment. On the 5th PRAVDA and a domestic service commentary cited French Foreign Minister Schumann as also saying the initiative is "in accordance with the Mansfield amendment." The PRAVDA commentator on the 3d predicted that the Administration will probably react with "demagogic statements" designed to "whitewash" the U.S. "adventurist course," a technique demonstrated in the Pentagon papers. But this time, the commentator remarked, it will be "much more difficult" to reject the PRG initiative, which "even the American press calls 'an important and positive event.'" In a domestic service commentary on the 5th Vasilyev remarked that this is the first time since the inception of the Paris talks that the Americans have studied a Vietnamese proposal so carefully--a reaction "assisted" by the publication of the Pentagon documents.

Ilinskiy wrote in the 3 July IZVESTIYA that the movement for cessation of the war is widening in the United States and that "many prominent U.S. politicians" are appealing to the government "not to let slip the wonderful opportunity" afforded by the PRG initiative. TASS reports such statements by a number of U.S. spokesmen, including Senators Hatfield, McGovern, Church, and Muskie and former Defense Secretary Clifford, as well as comment from the New York TIMES, the Washington POST, and other U.S. newspapers.

While Moscow's comment on the PRG initiative generally follows Vietnamese communist media's usage in referring to a "government of national concord," the 3 July Ilinskiy IZVESTIYA article appeared to treat this as synonymous with a "coalition government." Noting the PRG proposal for the government of "national concord," IZVESTIYA commented that the formation of a "broad coalition government" in Saigon would create the necessary conditions for the peaceful reunification of Vietnam.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1971

- 13 -

MOSCOW CONTINUES COMMENT ON PENTAGON PAPERS, ATTACKS ON PRC

Continuing Moscow propaganda on the furor over publication in the U.S. press of the secret Pentagon report on U.S. Vietnam policy stresses that the Nixon Administration's displeasure with the publicity stems from the fact that its own "duplicity" is being revealed. TASS promptly reports without comment the 30 June Supreme Court decision allowing the newspapers to resume their publication, and on 1 July TASS briefly mentions the decision when reporting that Attorney General Mitchell announced that the Administration still intends to institute criminal proceedings against those who broke federal laws in connection with the publication.

CRITICISM Moscow continues to assail Peking's "splittist"
OF PEKING Indochina policies in routine-level radio comment both in connection with the Pentagon papers and in more general contexts. A 5 July Mandarin-language Radio Peace and Progress broadcast repeats claims that the Pentagon documents show that the United States took Peking's "splittist" policies into account when it planned the escalation of the war against the DRV. It cites once again the 22 January 1964 memorandum of General Taylor which pointed out that Peking's policies were a favorable factor in planning U.S. military actions against the DRV, and President Johnson's 20 March 1964 telegram to Ambassador Lodge suggesting that actions against the DRV be postponed until after a deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations.

A Radio Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on 2 July recalls statements made in 1965 to the effect that China would not enter the war if its territory were not threatened. The commentator recalls President Johnson's order not to bomb "an area in the northern DRV where a Chinese construction team was stationed." The commentator also makes an unusual reference to the Chinese presence in Laos when it adds that this was also true of Laos, "where the Chinese are building roads." He further recalls that when the United States sponsored the invasion of southern Laos Secretary Rogers declared that the United States would not threaten China, and adds that when the United States launched aggression against Cambodia and Laos "informal contacts between the Chinese and U.S. representatives were established through go-betweens." The commentator concludes that the United States obviously does not want China to hamper its expansionism in Southeast Asia while China's game is to get the United States to recognize its "special role" in Asia in order to weaken Soviet influence in Indochina.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1971

- 14 -

DRV SPOKESMAN, COMMENT SCORE U.S. STRIKES AGAINST NORTH

A 2 July DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest, publicized by Hanoi media that day, in standard fashion scores the United States for air and artillery strikes against the DMZ and air strikes against Quang Binh Province. The protest alleged that on 30 June and 1 July there was bombing of Huong Lap village and shelling, by artillery based south of the demilitarized zone and from U.S. ships, against Vinh Quang, Vinh Giang and Vinh Son villages--which the protest says are located north of the 17th parallel.* It further charges that on the 1st, U.S. aircraft "attacked places in the western part of Quang Binh Province."

Atypically, the strikes also prompt additional comment. NHAN DAN on the 3d declares that the actions "represent new barbarous crimes" against the North. It also claims that they "furnished further evidence of the stubborn, perfidious and warlike nature" of the Administration, and "laid bare the President's insidious tricks and sinister plans" to expand the war. LPA on the same day echoes these sentiments and adds that the strikes are a "continuation of Nixon's systematic military adventures against the DRV."

On at least four other occasions since the large-scale 21-22 March U.S. strikes in the North, the U.S. Command in Saigon has acknowledged U.S. action against North Vietnam. And there have been frequent DRV protests as well. But only on one such occasion, when U.S. planes were allegedly downed, was there followup comment to the protests--a Hanoi radio commentary on 23 April and a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on 24 April, in regard to U.S. strikes condemned in spokesman protests on the 22d and 24th.** There has been no claim that planes were downed during the latest strikes.

* A spokesman for the U.S. Command in Saigon on 2 July acknowledged U.S. action in the northern half of the DMZ on 30 June.

** See the 28 April TRENDS, pages 11-12.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1971

- 15 -

PATHET LAO'S LATEST PEACE PROPOSAL GETS FURTHER PUBLICITY

Continued publicity for the latest NLHS peace proposal* in Pathet Lao propaganda includes editorial comment, accounts of rallies, and statements by NLHS leaders praising the initiative as showing the NLHS' "good will." Much of the comment calls on the armed forces and people to score greater military victories and "compel" the United States and "ultrarightist reactionaries" to accept the proposal.

A 4 July Pathet Lao radio commentary engages in distortion to denigrate Souvanna Phouma's attitude toward the new proposal. It says that "to avoid accepting the proposal," Souvanna Phouma made public on 22 June, the "same day" the NLHS proposal was dated, his letter to UN Secretary General U Thant which reiterates "deceitful charges" against the DRV and the NLHS. The commentary adds that in the letter to U Thant, Souvanna Phouma also made "excuses for his traitorous acts by saying that there is nothing new in Prince Souphanouvong's recent proposal." Souvanna Phouma's letter to U Thant, released in Vientiane media on 22 June, was dated 28 April and thus made no mention of any new Souphanouvong initiative. The date of its release, while corresponding with the date of Souphanouvong's letter containing the NLHS proposal, preceded Souvanna Phouma's actual receipt of that message, which was not publicized by Pathet Lao media themselves until the 25th.

Moscow has reported the DRV and PRG Foreign Ministry statements supporting the proposal issued last week, but the only Soviet comment thus far is a Moscow radio commentary in Lao on 3 July which calls it a "new, constructive, and creative" proposal. Emphasizing the need for an end to U.S. bombing, it calls this "one of the most important conditions for restoring peace and security in Laos," adding that the NLHS has pointed out that the U.S. air war is the "primary obstacle" to a peaceful settlement in Laos.

As in the case of the 12 May NLHS proposal, Peking has reported Laotian and Vietnamese statements but avoids any comment on its own authority.

* See the 30 June TRENDS, pages 8-10, for a discussion of the plan. Advanced in a 22 June message from Souphanouvong to Souvanna Phouma, it calls for a cease-fire "including" an American bombing halt, to be followed by talks by the "concerned parties" in Laos held alternately in the Plain of Jars and Vientiane.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

8 JULY 1971

- 16 -

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

MAJOR PRAVDA ARTICLE PROPOSES NEW SINO-SOVIET BORDER TREATY

Moscow has used the occasion of the CCP's 50th anniversary to offer to negotiate a new border treaty with the Chinese while reaffirming the basic lines of its ideological case against the Maoist leadership. The offer appeared in a major PRAVDA article marking the anniversary on 1 July, carried over the authoritative signature of "I. Aleksandrov,"* which pressed forward Moscow's balanced line calling for normalized state relations despite ideological differences. In addition to the Aleksandrov attribution, another sign of the importance attached to the lengthy article is the fact that it was carried textually by TASS and Radio Moscow's domestic service as well as being given broad dissemination in foreign broadcasts, including extensive coverage in broadcasts to China.

Both Peking and Moscow used the anniversary to parade support for their respective ideological banners. Peking's joint editorial article on the occasion, recalling "the great polemics" in the international communist movement, promised a "struggle to the end" against "modern revisionism with Soviet revisionism at its center." The article took a particularly sharp slap at "Brezhnev and company" as "mad present-day social imperialists and world stormtroopers opposing China." The formula concerning Soviet revisionism is pro forma for such occasions; the latter denunciation reflects the bitter anti-Soviet animosity which sometimes comes to the surface in major ideological pronouncements but which Peking has largely suppressed in the past year or so in the interests of flexibility.

* I. Aleksandrov, a possible pseudonym, has been associated with major policy statements at crucial junctures in the past in Moscow's relations with China and Czechoslovakia. Aleksandrov articles appear in the same place and format--except for the name--as PRAVDA editorial articles, the most authoritative form of Soviet commentary.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

8 JULY 1971

- 17 -

Peking acknowledged messages on the anniversary from the Vietnamese communists, the North Koreans, Albania, and Romania--the latter being the only member of the Warsaw Pact to send party greetings. The Yugoslavs announced a party message, but Peking--evidently not prepared to resume party relations--has not acknowledged it. In keeping with a major party anniversary, Peking accorded priority on this occasion to ideological concerns and provided a forum for a wide range of client parties, including several which are mentioned only rarely in PRC media. Among the messages carried by Peking were those from the Burmese CP, the PKI, pro-Peking parties in Latin America, and the "Polish Communist Party" of Kazimierz Mijal. Most of these messages paid homage to the universality of "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought" as a guiding ideology, a claim Peking no longer advances in its own name.

In an effort to present a show of unity in the Soviet bloc on the China question, PRAVDA on 2 and 3 July rounded up press comment from Moscow's East European allies plus Ulan Bator but pointedly excluded Bucharest. The Romanian press did in fact carry comment on the CCP anniversary--a 1 July commentary in the party paper SCINTEIA which, according to NCNA's pleased account, "warmly greeted" the Chinese. Viewed against the background of the cool reception given Romanian leader Ceausescu during his recent stopover in Moscow after an Asian tour that included the PRC, the pattern of reaction on the anniversary among Moscow, Bucharest, and Peking makes it seem unlikely that the Romanians were able to play a mediatory role in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

MOSCOW ON CCP The Aleksandrov PRAVDA article interpreted Chinese communist history along standard Soviet lines as a continuing struggle between "the Marxist-Leninist and internationalist forces"--that is, elements in the CCP favorable to alliance with Moscow--and "petit bourgeois nationalist forces" led by Mao. But while expressing sympathy for Mao's opponents, the article pulled its punches in depicting the conflict over Maoist policies. It did not, for instance, use the formulation "Mao and his group," an anathema formula implying that the Maoist faction lacks legitimacy as a party leadership. Moreover, the article had recourse to an implicit historical parallel rather than commenting directly on the most sensitive issues in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Thus it

CONFIDENTIAL

- 18 -

recalled that in the past Chiang Kai-shek combined terror against the CCP with an anti-Soviet campaign and later with armed provocations along the Sino-Soviet border, and it said that the "Chinese communists-internationalists" opposed Chiang's calls for war against the Soviet Union and his indictment of Moscow's "red imperialism"--an analogue of Peking's current charge of Soviet "social imperialism."

Characteristically, the article cited the Eighth CCP Congress in 1956 as the source of correct policies, including those directed toward cooperation with the Soviets. It made a point of noting that the constitution adopted at that congress declared that the CCP is guided by Marxism-Leninism, but it left it to the reader to recall that the previous constitution--adopted at the seventh congress in 1945, when Soviet influence on the CCP was minimal--enshrined Mao's thought along with Marxism-Leninism as the source of guidance for the CCP. Citing the resolution of the eighth congress as warning against petit bourgeois nationalist ideology, PRAVDA noted that later events demonstrated how timely this warning was inasmuch as the Maoists subsequently proceeded to undermine the decisions of the congress. (It is noteworthy that Peking's joint editorial article on the anniversary denounced the congress resolution for containing "sinister trash" inserted by "Liu Shao-chi and his gang.")

In reviewing current Soviet policy toward China, the Aleksandrov article carefully skirted the question of party relations while renewing the appeal to avoid shifting "the existing serious ideological differences" onto the plane of state relations. The "principled and consistent" Soviet line, according to the article, is determined by recognition of the importance to the communist cause of friendship and cooperation with the Chinese people and "Chinese communists." In what seems an effort to associate Brezhnev personally with this exposition of the Soviet line, the article cited the party chief's speeches along with the past two CPSU congresses and central committee plenums as expressing Moscow's policy.

An interest in probing the possibility of party ties seems reflected in a PRAVDA account on 3 July, on the same page as the roundup of East European comment on China, of a message from the French CP greeting the CCP on its anniversary. The message appealed for unity of action by "all socialist countries and all communist parties" in view of "American imperialism's aggressive policy" and "urgent tasks" in Indochina, the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

8 JULY 1971

- 19 -

Middle East, and Europe. The PRAVDA account concludes by quoting the message as expressing hope that the CCP will again take the path of common struggle by the international communist movement. Thus, while the CPSU's own appeal--via the Aleksandrov article--was pitched imprecisely to the "Chinese communists," the proxy of a friendly party--but one outside "the socialist community"--was used to direct an appeal to the CCP as such.

BORDER QUESTION The Aleksandrov article introduced a shift in the Soviet line on the border issue by proposing both the implementation of measures "facilitating an improvement in mutual understanding" and "the final solution of all disputed border questions through the conclusion of a new border treaty [dogovor]." In addition to spelling out Moscow's objectives at the border talks more fully than in past statements, this formulation puts on public record for the first time a Soviet willingness to negotiate a comprehensive new treaty to settle the border dispute. As such it signals a further step forward from Moscow's initial opposition to reopening the territorial question as a subject for renegotiation.

In the exchange of formal statements during the period of acute border tensions in 1969, Peking had demanded Soviet acknowledgment that the existing treaties governing the border were "unequal treaties" imposed by tsarist Russia and had called for a new treaty to settle the dispute. Moscow rejected this demand and offered only to resume the abortive 1964 "consultations" (konsultatsii) for the limited purpose of defining the boundary "more precisely at some stretches" of the border, thus resisting the effort to reopen the border question as a whole. Moscow's concern in this regard was reflected in a government statement on 13 June 1969 which quoted Chou En-lai as saying in 1960 that if old grievances were converted into territorial claims, the world would be plunged into chaos.

A compromise between the two positions as a result of the 11 September 1969 meeting between Premiers Kosygin and Chou En-lai led to the opening of the border talks on 20 October that year. A 7 October PRC Government statement announcing the agreement to hold talks repeated the demand for "all-round negotiations" on the border question but omitted the demand that Moscow acknowledge the existing treaties as being unequal. The statement disclosed that the two sides had agreed to open negotiations on "the Sino-Soviet boundary question," a

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

8 JULY 1971

- 20 -

formulation the Chinese have used consistently in defining the subject of the talks. Moscow's announcement on the agreement said that negotiations (peregovory) would be held on "questions in which both sides are interested," reflecting Moscow's interest in using the talks for broader purposes of normalizing state relations. Subsequent Soviet statements specified border questions as among the topics. And in recent months--progress having been achieved on such other matters as resumed ambassadorial ties and improved trade relations--the Soviets have mentioned only the border issue as the subject of the talks. At any rate, the Soviets had agreed to enter into negotiations rather than merely to hold "consultations."

Prior to the Aleksandrov article's explicit proposal for a new border treaty, Moscow had consistently defined the objective of the talks to be "a settlement [uregulirovanie] of border questions"--the formulation used in Brezhnev's 30 March 1971 Central Committee report to the CPSU congress. The change in the Soviet line raises the question of whether prospects might have brightened for another compromise on the border issue, one that would give the Soviets confidence in suggesting a new treaty despite their deep fear of opening a Pandora's box of territorial claims (Japanese pressures regarding the Soviet-held "northern territories" currently bedevil Moscow's relations with Tokyo).

In his congress report Brezhnev observed that the border talks "are going slowly," adding that "of course not just one side must take a constructive stand if they are to end favorably." Brezhnev ignored the border question in his subsequent speeches at three East European party congresses; and unlike last year, when the three top Soviet leaders complained of lack of progress at the talks in their June election speeches, the triumvirs remained silent on China in speaking to their constituents this June. The only Soviet elite assessment of the talks during this period was made by Politburo member Kirilenko in his 8 June speech at the Mongolian party congress--an occasion on which the Soviets could hardly pass over the China problem. Like Brezhnev, he complained that the Peking talks are going slowly (in the recorded version broadcast by Radio Moscow he was heard to say the talks were proceeding "slowly, extremely slowly," but the PRAVDA text contained only the first adverb).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1971

- 21 -

The Aleksandrov article did not address itself directly to the progress of the talks, limiting itself to the observation that negotiations can be successful "only when both partners display good will and make efforts to achieve an agreement [soglashenie]." Moreover, while avoiding complaints about a lack of progress, the article struck a hopeful note by citing Peking's declaration that ideological differences should not impede state relations between the two countries on the basis of "the five principles of peaceful coexistence." Though the article carefully avoided endorsing this revisionist interpretation of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence,* it made the point that the Soviets "take into consideration the Chinese side's expression of readiness not to shift ideological disagreements onto state relations." This seems an unusual move to put an ideologically offensive use of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence into the service of a conciliatory Soviet line.

Whatever the motives behind Moscow's move at this time--whether, for example, it represents an extension to China of Moscow's current "peace" program or is responsive to developments in Peking--there seem to be some unpropitious elements on the Chinese side. Peking's keen resentment over Soviet military pressure along the border, presumably a factor complicating the talks, does not seem to have abated in view of the 1 July joint editorial article's bitter reference to the Soviets as "world stormtroopers opposing China." Another complication would be the incapacity of the chief Chinese negotiator, Chiao Kuan-hua, due to illness. Chiao was last reported in public on 24 May. In view of his position as deputy foreign minister in charge of Soviet and East European relations, he would have been expected to appear during the June visits of Romania's Ceausescu and the Yugoslav foreign secretary. Moreover, the PRC delegation at the border talks was represented by its deputy chief, Chai Cheng-wen, in the group of Chinese officials which called on the Soviet embassy on 2 July to express condolences on the death of three Soviet cosmonauts.

* This interpretation has long been associated with the Yugoslavs, who in their opposition to bloc politics have called for the principles of peaceful coexistence to be applied to relations between communist countries as well as between countries with different political systems. The Chinese recently adopted this interpretation in order to accommodate their improving relations with the Yugoslavs. See the TRENDS of 16 June 1971, pages 38-40.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1971

- 22 -

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

PRC RENEWS WORLD CONFERENCE BID AS USSR PRESSES OWN PROPOSAL

The long-standing Chinese proposal for a world summit conference to conclude an agreement on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and, as a first step, an agreement not to use nuclear weapons is again broached in the statement signed by the China-Japan Friendship Association and a visiting delegation of the opposition Komeito Party of Japan. According to the statement, released by NCNA on 2 July the Chinese side "reaffirmed" the PRC's conference proposal--resurfaced last November after a four-year hiatus--and the Japanese side expressed support for it. The statement goes on to note that both sides "oppose the power politics of big powers, oppose their nuclear blackmail and nuclear threat, and are determined to struggle against nuclear war and for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons."

Peking media have remained totally silent on the USSR's renewed call for a conference of the world's five nuclear powers to discuss nuclear disarmament. But the media's revived publicity for the PRC's world conference idea coincides with the appearance in the Western press of reports on Premier Chou En-lai's rejection of the Soviet proposal,* formalized in a government statement addressed to Peking, Washington, London, and Paris and publicized by Moscow beginning 22 June.

BACKGROUND The Chinese proposal for a world summit conference dates back to 1963, when a PRC Government statement following the signing of the partial test-ban treaty called for a gathering to discuss the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. In the government statement announcing the first Chinese nuclear test in October 1964, the proposal was revised to include the suggestion that "as a first step" the conference reach an agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons.

* Most recently, the Washington POST reported on 4 July that Chou had told members of a visiting Canadian trade mission that participation in talks limited to the nuclear powers would run counter to China's policy of shunning big-power politics. The report added that he indicated the PRC would continue to insist that the talks be open to all nations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1971

- 23 -

The proposal continued to appear in Chinese elite propaganda through July 1966, but it was unmentioned from then until 1 November 1970--a period roughly coinciding with the cultural revolution and the PRC's withdrawal from an active foreign policy.

On 1 November 1970, on the eve of the reopening of the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) in Helsinki, a joint statement of the China-Japan Friendship Association and a visiting Japanese Socialist Party delegation said that the latter group supported the Chinese proposal for a world summit conference to discuss nuclear disarmament. Two weeks later, a PRC-Pakistani communique on Yahya Khan's visit noted Pakistan's "positive interest" in the Chinese proposal.

Peking media did not report Chou En-lai's remarks to Edgar Snow, in an interview published in the Italian L'EPOCA on 13 December 1970, in which he said "we renew the proposal for a summit conference of all countries of the world" to reach an agreement on the total prohibition of nuclear weapons and, as a first step, an agreement on their non-use.*

MOSCOW'S PROPOSAL Soviet media continue to claim wide support for a conference of the five nuclear powers. Participants in the domestic service commentators' roundtable show on the 4th, for example, said that "several governments" have stated their support for the proposal and that the world press has noted the "great positive significance" such a conference would have for the international climate. One panelist, complaining that Washington has not yet given a definite answer to the Soviet proposal, said that the State Department has disavowed a statement by James Leonard, chief of the U.S. delegation at the Geneva disarmament talks, which at the time the "world press had assessed as a positive, forthright reaction by Washington diplomacy to the Soviet proposal." (TASS had said on 29 June that "members of the American delegation answered

* For further background on the PRC summit proposal, including Soviet reaction, see the TRENDS of 4 November 1970, pages 26-27.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PBIS TRENDS
13 JULY 1971

- 24 -

In the affirmative" when asked if Leonard's remarks at the opening session of the Geneva talks could be regarded as agreement to the conference proposal.)

An article in NEW TIMES (No. 26, 25 June 1971) observed that it was gratifying that the views of the USSR and France "coincide" on the need for a five-power conference and declared that "the matter now rests with the other nuclear powers."

SALT: PRAVDA ATTACKS U.S. OPPONENTS OF ARMS LIMITATION

Moscow marked the reopening of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) in Helsinki on 8 July with a lengthy article by V. Viktorov in the 7 July PRAVDA that essentially recaps the 20 May joint U.S.-Soviet statement issued at the Vienna round, outlining the focus of negotiations for the year, and reiterates the various lines of Soviet propaganda attack on U.S. opponents of an agreement on arms limitation. Widely broadcast in summary form to Radio Moscow's audiences worldwide, the article represents the most substantial Soviet press comment on SALT since the 3 February PRAVDA article by V. Shestov.*

Viktorov draws on the testimony of "eminent" U.S. scientists to demonstrate the advisability of dealing first with ABM systems: He cites Drs. York and Panofsky for the observation that deployment of ABM's will lead to an "irreversible growth" in the number of offensive missiles aimed at overcoming defenses. And he says "the view is also being voiced" that it is easier to limit ABM deployment, which is still in the initial stage, than to agree on a reduction of types of weapons already in the arsenals of armed forces.

While stressing the "priority" nature of ABM limitation, Viktorov observes that it is only one of the issues under discussion at Vienna and Helsinki. The Soviet Union, he says, "remains on the platform of the understanding" reached

* The Shestov article, notable for its discussion of U.S. foreign bases in the context of SALT, is reviewed in the TRENDS of 10 February 1971, pages 22-23.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

8 JULY 1971

- 25 -

at the outset of the talks that both defensive and offensive weaponry must be examined; and he comments that the 20 May agreement contained the proviso that "given the conclusion of an agreement on ABM's, some measures would also be agreed on in the sphere of limiting strategic offensive arms."

Viktorov routinely takes to task the "considerable number of opponents" of an agreement in the United States. He is critical of "certain militarist circles" in the United States who are allegedly insisting on the need to continue the arms race, including those who seek to depict increases in military appropriations and the creation and development of new weapons systems as the best means of achieving results at disarmament talks. While the article takes note of the continued presence of U.S. overseas bases, it does not belabor the issue--a major point in the Shestov article, which had complained about people in the United States who were trying to prevent SALT from discussing U.S. forward bases and their arsenals of nuclear weapons.

The article warns that "saber-rattling makes a poor accompaniment" to SALT and that attempts to conduct the talks from a position of strength "can only make the atmosphere . . . less favorable." While this truth is not getting through to the "Pentagon leaders," Viktorov says, "it cannot fail to be shared by reasonable political figures overseas" who realize it is useless to speak to the USSR in the "language of force."

Urging that the talks be held under the principle of "equal security" and without seeking unilateral advantage, Viktorov goes on to quote from Brezhnev's 11 June pre-election speech in which he had complained of Washington's "vociferous anti-Soviet outburst" about the Soviet defense program "on the eve of the adoption of the latest military budget" in the United States. Paraphrasing Brezhnev, Viktorov asks what justification Washington has for expecting the USSR to renounce "already adopted programs if the American government, through the period of the talks, has taken several very big decisions to build up its strategic forces."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS ITEM IS

8 JULY 1971

- 26 -

SEMENOV The head of the Soviet delegation to SALT, Deputy
REMARKS Foreign Minister V. S. Semenov, in his arrival
 remarks in Helsinki on the 7th repeated the
customary Soviet commitment to serious negotiations. TASS
reported his statement that the Soviet Government has given
clear instructions to the delegation "to work constructively
and to secure concrete results." He said the work that lies
ahead has been defined in the 20 May joint statement, but he
did not specify the issues.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIO TRENDS
8 JULY 1971

- 27 -

MIDDLE EAST

COMMUNIQUE ON RIYAD VISIT SUPPORTS UAR VIEWS ON SUEZ ISSUE

The joint communique issued on Egyptian Foreign Minister Riyadh's 29 June-4 July visit to Moscow to exchange ratification instruments of the friendship treaty contains some interesting departures from the standard format. Moscow formally goes on record as supporting Cairo's position that a partial Israeli withdrawal from Suez must be part of an overall settlement including Israeli withdrawal to the pre-5 June 1967 lines. Other notable features include the sides' support for Jarring's mission, which has been mentioned only in passing in some recent Soviet-UAR communiqués, and their commitment to a political settlement of the crisis based on full implementation of the November 1967 Security Council resolution. Earlier communiqués had not been this explicit, calling rather for coordination of efforts "in the direction" of a political settlement or referring to UAR efforts to solve the problem by political means.

The communique notes the 1 July exchange of ratification instruments of the treaty, which was signed in Cairo on 27 May. Bilateral relations are discussed exclusively in the context of the treaty, which is said to "further invigorate" Soviet-UAR relations in various fields--there is no mention of the military field or of Soviet "defense" or other assistance to the UAR--as well as to "deal a blow" to imperialist plans and contribute to normalizing the Middle East situation.

The communique contains no mention of the atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding commonly described in such Soviet-Egyptian documents. While Brezhnev had a "friendly conversation" with Riyadh, Gromyko and Riyadh are merely said to have had "meetings and conversations." (TASS did describe the foreign ministers as having a "friendly exchange of opinions" on bilateral relations and the Middle East on the 30th, but merely noted an "exchange of opinions" at their concluding meeting on 3 July.) There is the usual reference to an "exchange of views" on international topics and particularly the Middle East, but the customary "coincidence" or "similarity" of views on international questions is absent, as it was from the communique on Podgorny's May visit to Cairo.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

8 JULY 1971

- 28 -

SUEZ In the communique, the Soviet side for the first
ISSUE time subscribes formally to Egypt's views on the reopening of the Suez Canal as proposed by President as-Sadat on 4 February and "defined" by him on 2 April, and subsequently reiterated by Egyptian officials. The problem of opening the canal for international shipping, the communique says, cannot be solved in isolation from other problems of the settlement, and "should be in context with an agreement on withdrawal of all Israeli troops to lines held before 5 June 1967, with the establishment of fixed deadlines for this withdrawal."*

Routine-level Soviet comment has taken note of Cairo's stand in charging, as Belyayev put it on 23 May, that the United States is isolating the Suez question from the settlement problem, while the Arabs insist that a Suez reopening must be part of an overall settlement providing for "liberation of all Arab territories" as well as recognition of Palestinian rights. Propaganda has, in general, put more emphasis on Cairo's "constructive" 15 February reply to Jarring's 8 February memorandum, which included points on freedom of navigation; thus the 28 February Soviet Government statement focused on the response to Jarring. In his 30 March report to the CPSU Congress, Brezhnev cited both the acceptance of Jarring's proposals and Cairo's Suez proposal as "important UAR initiatives." The Suez problem was not dealt with in the two Soviet-Egyptian communiqués (Riyad in Moscow in April, Podgorny in Cairo in May) issued since the as-Sadat canal proposal in February.

* Egypt's April "definition" declared that partial withdrawal should be a procedural move linked with a full solution on the basis of implementation of all of Resolution 242, and first of all withdrawal from all Arab territories; during a "definite cease-fire period" Jarring would draw up provisions to solve the crisis and "the timetable for their implementation, especially full withdrawal." The communique on Ponomarev's December 1970 visit had called for a timetable for the withdrawal of troops from all occupied territories and the implementation of other provisions of Resolution 242. See the FBIS TRENDS, 23 December 1970, pp. 35-36

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PERS TRENDS

8 JULY 1971

- 29 -

SETTLEMENT, Past communiques have generally made some
WITHDRAWAL mention of a peaceful settlement but not
necessarily laid it down as policy; the sides
now explicitly state that a settlement by political means,
based on fulfillment of all provisions of Resolution 242,
"continues to be a principled line" of the USSR and the UAR.
The communique underlines this position in routinely charging
that Israel, with U.S. aid and support, sabotages all efforts
at a peaceful settlement based on the resolution. It goes on
to affirm that a settlement should encompass all aspects of
the problem, first of all Israeli withdrawal from all occupied
Arab territories,* establishment of peace, and insurance of
the Palestinian Arabs' lawful rights. This formulation
departs from the pattern employed, with some variations,
in Soviet-Egyptian communiques in the past several months:
that a fair and lasting peace--not a settlement, as used
here--must be based on Israeli withdrawal from all occupied
territories, full implementation of Resolution 242, and
insurance of the Palestinians' rights. The calls for
withdrawal and implementation of the resolution have
sometimes appeared in reverse order; the Nasir communique
last July inserted "urgent measures to end Israeli armed
attacks"; and the May 1971 Podgorny communique relegated
the Palestinians to a separate paragraph in the communique.
The communique on Kosygin's visit for Nasir's funeral last
October, in light of the circumstances, omitted this
formulation and said the sides reaffirmed the need for
the earliest elimination of the consequences of Israel's
aggression and the establishment of a lasting peace for all
peoples of the area.

SUPPORT FOR The sides also now specifically support the
JARRING Jarring mission, whereas recent communiques,
when mentioning Jarring at all, have referred
only to Israeli obstruction of his mission ('Ali Sabri
communique, December 1970) or to Israel's negative attitude
to his proposals (Riyad communique, April 1971).

* Moscow propaganda does not always specify withdrawal
from "all" occupied territory, but this formula has been
employed in the past five Soviet-Egyptian communiques, and
was stated by Brezhnev as early as 5 July 1967 in a speech
at a Kremlin reception.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
8 JULY 1971

- 30 -

"JOINT STEPS" The sides devoted attention, the current communique says, to "the steps taken by the Soviet Union and the UAR" in the struggle for "liquidation of the aftermaths of Israeli aggression." While the "steps taken" is a new element in Cairo-Moscow communiques, it may relate to references in previous such documents to the sides' agreement on "further joint steps" to normalize the situation, as in the April Riyadh communique and the July 1970 and 1968 Nasir communiques. In a current reference to such steps, the communique says that "in connection with the treaty," views were exchanged on "further steps by the sides" regarding a Middle East settlement.

As in the last Riyadh communique, the sides note the "great importance" of regular contacts and consultations, this time adding that these are envisaged in the treaty and pledging their "utmost expansion"; in April, the sides reaffirmed readiness "to continue" these contacts.

MOSCOW PUBLICIZES RATIFICATION OF UAR-SOVIET TREATY

Moscow plays up the ratification of the Soviet-UAR friendship and cooperation treaty, publicizing the 18 June joint meeting of the foreign relations commissions of the two chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and giving even more prominence to the 28 June session of the Supreme Soviet Presidium which ratified the treaty. UAR Foreign Minister Riyad's visit to exchange ratification instruments received somewhat subdued propaganda attention, presumably because of the deaths of the Soviet cosmonauts, which according to the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY caused a postponement of the exchange of ratification instruments and cancellation of some of Riyad's engagements.

While the two foreign ministers' speeches at the 1 July ceremony were widely publicized, Moscow gave no details of the "short friendly" speeches at Gromyko's 1 July luncheon for Riyad and no indication that speeches were exchanged at Riyad's reception the same day. There may have been some Soviet dissatisfaction that President as-Sadat did not head the delegation: The communique on Podgornyy's May visit to Cairo, during which the treaty was signed, spoke of as-Sadat's "forthcoming visit" to the USSR but there has apparently been no further reference to such a visit from either Cairo or Moscow media. Two days after

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

8 JULY 1971

- 31 -

the UAR People's Assembly approved the treaty, Cairo's AL-AHRAM reported on 15 June that Riyadh would head the delegation to Moscow; PRAVDA, citing the AL-AHRAM report, said merely that "a UAR delegation" would be sent to Moscow.

RATIFICATION DEBATES Speakers at the joint session of the foreign relations commissions on the 18th and at the Supreme Soviet session on the 28th echoed previous propaganda assessments of the treaty, declaring that it provides a "political and legal basis" for the further development of Soviet-Egyptian relations. They underlined the treaty's importance in assisting the UAR toward a new life on "the path of socialist orientation." Gromyko at the joint session on the 18th stressed the "defense character" of Soviet-UAR military cooperation, noting that the USSR will continue to assist the UAR in strengthening "its defense capacity, precisely its defense capacity, which the treaty says also." Summing up at the same session, Suslov declared that it was clear from the provisions of the treaty that Soviet-UAR cooperation "in all fields, including the military field, is not directed against any state and does not pursue any aggressive aims." He claimed that Soviet-UAR steps to increase the UAR's "capability for eliminating the consequences of the aggression" are "fully logical and legitimate" from the viewpoint of international law and the UN Charter.

Speakers also emphasized the treaty's "international importance," citing the parties' efforts for a political settlement in the Middle East. Gromyko observed on the 28th that the treaty would exert a favorable influence on Soviet relations with the Arab countries. At the joint session, Gromyko asserted that the treaty dealt a blow to "those forces" which wished to drive a wedge into Soviet-Egyptian relations, and which recently tried to depict the relations as having "cooled somewhat." Podgornyy at the Supreme Soviet session noted that "imperialist circles" had charged that the treaty "could allegedly lead to the 'restriction' of UAR sovereignty and the 'infringement' of its independence," and countercharged that it is the imperialist states which "palm off unequal, shackling conditions" in their treaties with other countries.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

8 JULY 1971

- 32 -

"BERGUS MEMO," HELMS TRIP SEEN AS EVIDENCE OF U.S. DUPLICITY

Moscow promptly seizes on the reports of CIA Director Helms' trip to Israel and belatedly takes up the matter of the "Bergus memorandum" to Egypt, citing them as evidence of U.S. diplomatic duplicity in the Middle East. At the same time, propagandists assail the mission of U.S. diplomats Bergus and Sterner in Cairo as yet another step in Washington's "notorious 'peacemaking mission'" in the Middle East. Commentators repeat the standard charge that the United States professes to be striving for a peaceful solution while in practice it supports Israel in its attempts to frustrate a peaceful settlement. Moscow repeatedly notes the opinion of Cairo's AL-JUMHURIYAH that U.S. policy is aimed at strengthening the aggressive circles and weakening the Arabs, and TASS on the 7th cites the paper as saying, with regard to the Bergus-Sterner mission and Vice President Agnew's current visit to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, that present U.S. diplomatic activity in the Middle East can bring nothing new to the Arab countries.

The Vice President's visit thus far has received minimal attention from Moscow: a broadcast in Arabic on the 7th reported "Beirut observers" as pointing out that his visit is motivated by a U.S. desire to replace the British in controlling the "Arabian Gulf." The same broadcast carried a dispatch from Cairo correspondent Kudryavtsev reporting that "Cairo observers" viewed the Agnew, Helms, and Bergus-Sterner visits and Sisco's "arrival here shortly" as aimed at lessening the negative Arab reaction to the intended shipment of more U.S. offensive weapons to Israel.

HELMS IN ISRAEL. TASS on 30 June promptly picked up press reports of the visit of CIA Director Helms to Israel, reporting from Washington that it was evident from "press comments" that one of the chief aims of the visit was "coordination of the subversive activity" of Israeli intelligence with U.S. plans in the Middle East. Subsequent broadcast and press reports have drawn on Israeli and Western press accounts and news agency dispatches for the conclusion that Helms' talks in Israel concerned the supply of additional military equipment to Israel and the possibility of some form of Israeli association with NATO. (Moscow since at least 1968 has sporadically charged that the United States would like to include Israel in NATO.)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1971

- 33 -

While Moscow apparently did not publicize a report in the Israeli paper MAARIV on the 1st that Helms would also visit Iran and Turkey, a broadcast in Turkish on the 3d said that Turkey and Iran were "stages of this ominous trip," and a Persian-language broadcast the next day claimed that according to the U.S. press, Helms was to persuade Teheran and Ankara to change their independent policies with respect to the Middle East crisis.

"BERG'S MEMO" Not until 1 July did Moscow take note of the controversy stemming from a Joseph Kraft report in the 27 June Washington POST that the head of the U.S. Interests Section in Cairo, Donald Bergus, had presented the Egyptians on 23 May with a memorandum pertaining to a Suez settlement. TASS on the 1st reported comments by unidentified Egyptian officials accompanying Foreign Minister Riyad to Moscow regarding a statement by a State Department spokesman that Bergus had not submitted to Cairo any proposal from the United States on an interim Suez settlement. According to TASS, the Egyptian officials said the UAR "does not understand" why the United States denied the existence of written proposals presented by Bergus on 23 May and answered by the UAR, at Bergus' request, on 4 June prior to his departure for Paris for talks with Secretary of State Rogers. (Moscow at the time apparently did not acknowledge the 6 June Bergus-Rogers talks in Paris.) The Egyptian officials, according to TASS, stated that denial of the Bergus proposals does not contribute to the establishment of confidence in the United States and "introduces vagueness and confusion into international relations."

Discussing the "rather unusual way" in which the "phantom memorandum" was presented, a panelist on the Moscow domestic service roundtable program on 4 July said it was not known in whose name the document was put forward. But when an official diplomatic representative of any power presents such a document, he added, there is no doubt that it is an official document of that government. He noted that as a result of Israeli demarches in Tel Aviv and Washington, a State Department spokesman declared on 28 June that Bergus did not put forward any U.S. proposal concerning an immediate settlement of the canal question. This episode, he concluded, demonstrated again that the United States completely supports the Israeli authorities' "aggressive course."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1971

- 34 -

BERGUS, STERNER TASS on the 4th reported from Washington
TALKS IN CAIRO that Bergus and Michael Sterner, head of
 the State Department's Egyptian Desk,
would arrive in Cairo on 5 July. A State Department official,
TASS said, had stated that they would not be handing over
any American proposals but would "discuss procedural questions."
Vasilyev, in RED STAR on the 6th, dismissed the mission as
another step in Washington's "notorious 'peacemaking mission'"
in the Middle East. Parenthetically noting that the envoys would
not convey proposals but would chiefly limit themselves to
procedural questions, Vasilyev labeled the trip as one of
"predetermined fruitlessness." According to TASS on the
7th, a Demchenko article in PRAVDA commented on the increased
visits of Washington's envoys, "bringing with them various
plans, proposals, and memorandums allegedly directed" at
a settlement. Washington is trying to create a semblance
of objectivity so as to play the role of mediator, Demchenko
said, but "all this bustle with plans, proposals, and
memorandums" is only intended to divert attention from
U.S. efforts to strengthen its positions in the Middle
East and expand cooperation with Israel.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

8 JULY 1971

- 35 -

INDONESIA

Noting that preliminary results of the 3 July Indonesian general elections indicate a victory for the government-backed Golkar organization, Radio Moscow in Indonesian on the 5th predictably viewed the outcome as a product of massive fraud, intimidation, and brutal pressures. Moscow's broadcasts in Indonesian since late 1970 have been denouncing the election campaign as a "farce" staged by the military to perpetuate a U.S.-backed antipopular regime.

Charging the authorities with raising the bogey of communism through the trial and arrests of communists timed with an eye to the elections, Moscow has used the opportunity to press claims that the Soviet-lining faction of the outlawed Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) represents the real interests of the Indonesian people. By early June, this propaganda had sufficiently irritated the Indonesian Government to provoke Djakarta radio complaints of "unlawful" electioneering by the "Moscow-oriented communists" via Radio Moscow, coupled with defenses of the outlawing of the PKI on grounds that it seeks to undermine the democratic system.

While Moscow sought to exploit the election campaign, Peking media did not deign to recognize its existence in sporadic commentaries denouncing the "fascist" Suharto regime and taking an uncompromising line of armed struggle against it. NCNA took notice of the elections for the first time the day after they were held, through the proxy of a "recent" statement by the head of the Chinese wing of the PKI, Jusuf Adjitorop, calling for opposition to the "general election farce" and for revolutionary overthrow of the regime. His party, Adjitorop asserted, had "discarded the revisionist road of 'peaceful transition' peddled by the Soviet revisionist renegade clique and realized that the road to liberation will be possible only through revolutionary armed struggle." Denigration of such "Maoist adventurist" sentiment has been a recurrent low-level theme of Moscow's comment.

MOSCOW BROADCASTS IN INDONESIAN DENOUNCE ELECTION "FARCE"

Moscow has pressed its attack on the election "farce" chiefly in broadcasts in Indonesian over Radio Moscow, making liberal use of quotations from various Indonesian emigre publications.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

8 JULY 1971

- 36 -

Radio Djakarta's complaints of Soviet meddling throughout June included at least two charges that Radio Moscow was using "Indonesian communist fugitives in the Soviet Union" in lieu of its own commentators to pursue its "anti-Indonesia campaign"-- an apparent allusion to Moscow citations from such publications as MARHAEN MENANG, identified in a 6 June Radio Moscow broadcast in Indonesian as a magazine "published by representatives of Indonesian circles abroad." Monitored radio comment on Moscow's own authority has been attributed to regular Soviet station commentators, most frequently Georgiy Avrin.

There has been negligible treatment of the Indonesian scene, including the elections, in Moscow's radio propaganda for audiences elsewhere in the world. The only central press commentary on the election campaign was a 23 June "information report" in PRAVDA, unattributed, drawing together the threads of the ongoing propaganda in Indonesian on pressures and restrictions on the voters, banning of opposition groups, intimidation of opposition leaders, and blatant threats by the army to use whatever force is necessary to achieve the election outcome ordained by the regime.

Moscow's broadcasts in Indonesian have been picturing intensive regime efforts to keep "progressive" voters away from the polls. A broadcast on 10 December said that the legislation which prohibits "former members of the PKI and other outlawed political parties" from voting or putting up candidates would "affect some 18 million persons." On 14 June, charging massive disenfranchisement of candidates and voters, Radio Moscow said an estimated 35 million Indonesians had been deprived of the right to vote. The 14 June broadcast described the election as "an election of generals"--the "consolidation of power by the armed forces without the participation of other people." It pointed to the heavily military composition of election preparatory committees and mentioned efforts to induce support for the candidates of the government-backed Golkar organization. The army and "security forces" have borne the brunt of the Soviet attack, which stops short of personal abuse of Suharto.

The 23 June PRAVDA commentary noted opposition party leaders' concern that the government may take steps after the election "to liquidate the existing party system" and cited threats of opposition leaders, "particularly the Muslim groups," to declare the election results "illegal and even launch a 'holy war' against the government." On 5 July, assessing the preliminary results,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI/TREND

8 JULY 1971

- 37 -

Radio Moscow's Georgiy Avrin quoted "foreign observers" as forecasting a continued increase in political tensions.

U.S. INTERESTS Charging that the election campaign regulations were designed to proscribe discussion of the real socio-economic problems plaguing the country, Moscow's broadcasts in Indonesian have been punctuated by charges that a Golkar victory would serve the interests of U.S. "monopoly capitalists bent on perpetrating "economic schemes" with the help of pliable elements in the government.

A companion secondary theme has sought to fan apprehensions about U.S. efforts to draw Indonesia into "the aggressive military bloc in Southeast Asia." A 7 May commentary in Indonesian said that the country is already "tied to the imperialist bloc" through military agreements with South Korea and Japan," through the existence of military bases in Indonesia "where U.S. officers have been working as instructors," and through ICBM launching sites "secretly built in West Irian." A broadcast on 19 May said the Pentagon had long had its eye on Indonesia as a prospective member of SEATO. The 22 June broadcast saw the United States trying to turn Indonesia "from its traditional neutral posture to one of military adventurism and to drag the Djakarta government into military blocs created to oppose socialist and developing countries."

The Soviet Union has been pictured, by contrast, as displaying understanding of Indonesia's economic difficulties, most notably by its agreement to reschedule payments of Indonesian debts. Broadcasts during May and June pointed to Soviet assistance in the construction of industrial projects in Indonesia, gifts of Soviet scientific books to Indonesian educational institutions, and exchanges of Indonesian and Soviet delegations. When the Indonesian Government banned distribution of the Soviet periodical NEW TIMES in Indonesia this spring, a Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Mandarin to Southeast Asia attributed the move to pro-imperialist forces dismayed at NEW TIMES' exposure of "Western monopolistic capital's activities" in the country. It was also, the broadcast said, a violation of the 1960 Soviet-Indonesian cultural agreement.

SOVIET COMMENT PRESSES FOR BROAD COMMUNIST-LED UNITED FRONT

Moscow comment on the election campaign has accused the government of seeking to divert attention from its own "tyranny" by "kindling anticommunist hysteria," and PRAVDA's 23 June commentary saw a

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

8 JULY 1971

- 38 -

series of trials of "eminent figures of the Indonesian Communist Party" staged to coincide with the election campaign. Radio Moscow asserted on 14 June that the communists have been made scapegoats precisely because of their appeal to the populace. It may be possible "to kill thousands and even tens of thousands of revolutionaries," a 23 May broadcast said, "but it is impossible to ban or destroy their ideas."

Moscow's prescriptions for the PKI have counseled a united front approach and cautioned against influence from Peking. Recalling the major setback dealt the communist movement in Indonesia by the events of 1965, the 23 May commentary declared that the members of the outlawed PKI, continuing their struggle in the face of persecution, "want to build a national unity front of all patriotic forces" and to "expand political work among the masses." In Indonesian on 14 June, Radio Moscow invoked the support of the June 1969 Moscow international party conference for "an action front of communist and all anti-imperialist forces" in Indonesia, looking toward formation of a "progressive government." The same broadcasts typically warned against "the harmful Maoist influence and adventuristic ideas," stating that the PKI's future "directly depends on its decision to dissociate itself immediately, firmly, and openly from the Maoist group and to keep the party's sovereignty and independence free from the harmful influences of Mao Tse-tung."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

8 JULY 1971

- 39 -

P R C - J A P A N

COMMUNIQUE DEFINES ISSUES DIVIDING PEKING AND TOKYO

A joint communique issued on 2 July by the China-Japan Friendship Association and a delegation of the Komeito Party--political arm of the militant Buddhist Soka Gakkai and the second largest opposition party in Japan--sought to give the impression that the Taiwan issue is the only major block to the restoration of diplomatic relations between China and Japan. A five-point position advanced by the Komeito delegation, the first to visit mainland China, expressed opposition to "the scheme of creating 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan,'" affirmed that Taiwan is China's internal affair, called for abrogation of the "illegal" 1952 Japan-Nationalist China treaty, condemned U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan and the Taiwan straits area, and declared that the PRC must be "restored her legitimate rights in all U.N. organizations" and the "Chiang Kai-shek clique" expelled.

Expressing its support for the five-point position, the Chinese side asserted that "in the event of the Japanese government's accepting the above-mentioned points and taking practical steps to this end the state of war between China and Japan can be ended, diplomatic relations restored, and a peace treaty concluded." The additional prospect of a mutual nonaggression treaty, "depending on developments," was also advanced.

The communique was signed by Wang Kuo-chuan, leader of the delegation of the China-Japan Friendship Association, and Komeito chairman Yoshikatsu Takeiri. Kuo Mo-jo, vice-chairman of the NPC Standing Committee and honorary president of the China-Japan Friendship Association, attended the signing ceremony. Chou En-lai met the Komeito delegation twice for "friendly conversations" during its 16 June-4 July stay in China.

The communique seems intended to provide fuel for pro-Peking forces within Japan and leverage against the Sato government. A 5 July interview with Kuo Mo-jo by ASAHI SHIMBUN correspondents in Peking, published on 7 July, quoted him as saying that the joint communique "will provide a premise for the realization of restoration of relations" between China and Japan. Kuo expressed hope that Komeito's five points would aid the "various forces which are asking that the Japan-China impasse be broken" and that these forces "will press the government for the restoration of Japan-China diplomatic relations."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

8 JULY 1971

- 40 -

Komeito's intention to use the communique to continue to exploit the recognition issue for domestic political gain was illustrated in a 5 July editorial in KOMEITO SHIMBUN. It stressed that "the Chinese side expects that our party will become a main pillar of the movement for Japan-Chinese normalization in Japan," and portrayed the joint statement as "the axis for normalization of Japan-Ch'na state-to-state relations." Prior to receiving the Chinese invitation on 8 June, Komeito candidates for last month's Upper House election campaigned in favor of recognizing the regime on the mainland as the sole legitimate government of China.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1971

- 41 -

K O R E A

PRC, DPRK STRESS ASIAN UNITY ON KOREAN WAR ANNIVERSARY

Peking and Pyongyang used the 21st anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, 25 June, to underscore the theme of Sino-Korean solidarity which also dominated last year's observance. Linking the two countries' security interests, the propaganda stressed the need for an Asian "united front" against the United States and Japan. North Korea's pro forma comment on U.S. "aggressive designs" in Korea and on the unification issue contained no surprises, but Pyongyang did place considerable stress on the danger of U.S.-instigated Japanese "militarism" to Korea and China. Moscow's treatment of the anniversary was along standard lines and, like last year's, included some low-level digs at Peking's "splittist" policies. Peking, on the other hand, avoided any anti-Soviet remarks; on last year's anniversary it had attacked Soviet "collusion" with the enemy.

PYONGYANG Pyongyang held the usual rally in the capital, attended by First Vice Premier Kim Il and addressed this year by Second Vice Premier Pak Song-chol--a higher-level functionary than those who have normally addressed the rallies on nondecennial anniversaries.* The rally was attended by low-level foreign delegations already present in the capital for a youth congress; several, including the Chinese and South Vietnamese delegates, made speeches. The Soviet and North Vietnamese representatives were present but did not speak. A few days before the rally the customary joint statement by mass organizations was issued, and other Pyongyang attention included the usual editorial comment and publicity for the "month of solidarity" traditionally observed abroad. Publicity for the South Korean struggle included a rally speech by the delegate of

* On the major 20th anniversary last year, Kim Il-song attended the rally and Kim Il delivered the address. Special foreign delegations, including a high-level Chinese delegation led by PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng and contingents from the Indochinese countries, attended the 20th anniversary celebration. Pak Song-chol went to Peking, where he was received by Mao and Lin Piao and addressed a rally along with PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

EBIS "TRENDS"
8 JULY 1971

- 42 -

a "South Korean revolutionary organization" who attended the youth congress. The rally adopted the usual "appeal to the South Korean people" to step up their struggle.

The charge that the United States and Japan are conspiring in intensified aggressive maneuvers in Asia pervaded the propaganda this year, against the background of the Okinawa reversion agreement and visits to South Korea by Premier Sato and various Japanese military officers. Carrying forward Pyongyang's effort to link Korean and Chinese security interests, Pak Song-chol echoed a 21 June DPRK Foreign Ministry statement on the Okinawa reversion agreement: He charged that the United States had stepped up its collusion with Pak Chong-hui, Chiang Kai-shek, and the Japanese "militarists" to speed military expansion into the "territory of Korea and China" and that the reversion of Okinawa poses a threat to the security of "our country and the socialist countries of Asia." Sounding the theme of Asian unity, he said that the situation thus demands that "all revolutionary people of Asia, including the Korean and Chinese people, further strengthen their anti-imperialist and anti-U.S. united front."

As usual Pyongyang avoided alluding to the Sino-Soviet dispute, and Pak Song-chol, in thanking the Chinese for sending volunteers during the Korean War, recalled in the customary manner the "support" given by the USSR and other socialist countries. Perhaps in deference to Chinese sensitivities, the DPRK Ambassador in Peking made no mention of the Soviet Union in his rally speech there, although last year Korean speakers in both Pyongyang and Peking had named the USSR. NCNA had carried the full texts of the 1970 speeches; the NCNA summary of Pak Song-chol's speech this year omitted his reference to support from the USSR.

PEKING Peking, which had marked the 20th anniversary last year with voluminous and effusive propaganda in keeping with the warming of relations with Korea, observed the occasion this time with a Peking rally addressed by NPC vice chairman Kuo Mo-jo and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial. As it did last year, Peking underscored the Asian unity theme by combining its observance of the Korean War anniversary with that of the 27 June anniversary of the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan.* (As in 1970, Pyongyang observed the two anniversaries separately.)

* The Taiwan anniversary is discussed in the 30 June TRENDS, pages 13-16.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

8 JULY 1971

- 43 -

In calling for Asian unity the Chinese seemed to be more willing than in recent months to associate Korean and Chinese security interests. Kuo Mo-jo, for example, asserted that the Japan-U.S. security treaty, turned into a "military alliance," directs its spearhead of aggression "squarely against the peoples of Korea, China, the three Indochinese countries, and the rest of Asia." He went on to postulate an increasingly favorable Asian revolutionary situation in view of the "powerful united front" formed by the people of Korea, China, the Indochinese and other Asian people in their "common struggle against U.S. imperialism." The image of Asian solidarity was further served by the presence at the Peking rally of members of Sihanouk's government, the DRV and PRG ambassadors, and "Laotian friends."

There was again, as on the anniversary last year, no public recollection by Peking of its treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with the DPRK. Peking did, however, mark last year's 11 July anniversary of the treaty signing with considerable publicity, in keeping with the return to amicable relations; it had given token publicity to the treaty anniversaries during the three prior years, when Sino-Korean relations were at their lowest ebb and the Korean War anniversary was being ignored in Peking propaganda.

In what may be related to the apparent reluctance to mention the Sino-Korean treaty on this occasion, Peking's comment on the Korean War anniversary repeatedly expressed support for aspirations for "peaceful" unification of Korea. The modifier was resurrected by Peking last fall for the first time since 1966, on the occasion of the October anniversary of the Chinese entry into the Korean War and in the CCP greetings to the Korean Workers Party congress last November, possibly as an admonition to the Koreans to avoid belligerent moves at a time when Peking was exhibiting reluctance to link its security interests with those of the DPRK. After dropping the adjective in subsequent months, Peking again used it in a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the April DPRK Supreme People's Assembly session and in other comment that month.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

8 JULY 1971

- 44 -

MOSCOW Moscow's treatment of the anniversary accorded with that of past years. A Moscow city meeting was addressed by a city official and the deputy chairman of the USSR-DPRK Friendship Association. Other publicity included a radio statement by an official of the friendship association, greetings messages from mass organizations, routine press and radio comment, and a press conference and TV statement by the DPRK ambassador.

Moscow's comment generally repeated routine support for North Korea's aspiration for "peaceful" unification and denounced in generalized terms the U.S. intensification of "tension" on the Korean peninsula by its "military preparations" in the ROK and "provocations" against the North. A 25 June PRAVDA article by Klyuchikov went beyond the usual standardized formulations, explicitly linking U.S. modernization of ROK forces and the moving of "fresh U.S. troops into the South" with a planned "march to the North" to "do away with" the DPRK. A RED STAR article on the 24th elaborated on alleged U.S. efforts to further involve Japan in "dangerous preparations," referring to the U.S.-Japan security treaty, the visits to the ROK of various Japanese military officers, and the reversion of Okinawa.

The USSR-DPRK treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual security was mentioned in press articles and by a Soviet speaker at the Moscow meeting. It was said to consolidate the "fraternal ties" between the two countries and to guarantee the achievements of the two peoples in building socialism, with PRAVDA adding that it "insures the security of the countries of the Far East." Last year the treaty was mentioned only by a Soviet official in a radio talk and not in press articles, although on at least the two previous anniversaries it was referred to in press comment. Moscow does not speak of "U.S. aggression" in connection with the treaty. On the anniversary in 1969 Moscow had said the treaty showed a resolve on both sides "to give each other help and support in the event of an armed attack."

As it did last year, Moscow took the opportunity to take some low-level digs at Peking's "splittist" policies in Mandarin-language broadcasts over Radio Moscow and Radio Peace and Progress. Ascribing U.S. "failure" in the Korean War to Sino-Soviet joint efforts, a Radio Moscow commentary on the 25th said Peking's subsequent refusal to cooperate

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1971

- 45 -

with the USSR now works to the advantage of the United States. It reiterated that the secret Pentagon documents published in the U.S. press show that the United States took China's attitude into account when it stepped up its actions in Indochina. A 26 June Radio Peace and Progress commentary recalled the aid the USSR gave the Korean people during and after the war, arguing that the facts refute "the slanderous concoction" that the Soviet Union has colluded with the United States to sabotage the Asian people's revolutionary struggle. A Soviet speaker at the Moscow rally appealed for socialist unity and strengthening of the "socialist camp" but avoided any direct attack on the Chinese.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS TRENDS

8 JULY 1971

- 46 -

PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

CCP 50TH ANNIVERSARY: HISTORY RETOLD, CELEBRATIONS LOW-KEYED

After over a year of propaganda on the importance of achieving goals in time for the 50th anniversary of the party, the 1 July date was allowed to pass with remarkably little fanfare. There were no central celebrations featuring the top leadership, and the heads of most provinces did not attend local observances. Contrary to previous indications, all provincial-level committees were not formed in time for the anniversary celebrations; four provinces, including Szechwan, China's largest, celebrated the half-century without benefit of a formal party organization.

These indicators of continued tensions within the PRC leadership were supplemented by a new history of the party released on 30 June in the form of a RED FLAG-PEOPLE'S DAILY-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial article. The article indicated that the problems of the cultural revolution were still too hot to handle: since Lin Piao summed up the basic experiences of the cultural revolution in his report to the Ninth Congress, "in this article we will not go into detail about this revolution."

The editorial article's account of party history adds little to other recent accounts, and draws largely on previous documents, especially those issued at the Ninth Congress. Many sentences are drawn directly from Lin's report and other congress documents, and most of the other material is drawn from old works by Mao and from the still-approved sections of the previous attempt at party historiography written at the Seventh Party Congress in 1945. Like that document, but with new emphasis drawn from the Ninth Congress, the history stresses the theme that when the party follows Mao all goes well, while troubled periods can all be attributed to failure to heed Mao's injunctions. The history does go beyond previous documents in specifically noting errors made at the Eighth Party Congress at which Liu Shao-chi is said to have "inserted sinister trash" into the congress resolution. Mao's article "On Contradictions" is portrayed as an answer to the congress resolution. In Lin's report to the Ninth Congress, he merely noted that Mao's article had followed shortly after the congress, not that it was a direct reply to congress errors.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1971

- 47 -

The further decline of the Red Guards as a political force is also evident in the current history. Lin had noted with approval their role in the early cultural revolution; while the history quotes Lin's remarks on this period almost word for word, all his references to the important role played by the Red Guards have been eliminated. Instead there is a new and direct defense of the cultural revolution, apparently in answer to those who may still complain that the revolution was unnecessary and that Mao could have simply dismissed Liu and his followers from office. The history indicates that Mao did indeed have this power, but defends the revolution on the grounds that Liu's organization could be eliminated and the masses tempered only by the more drastic means of the cultural revolution: "The masses learned in the stormy struggle what they could not have learned in normal times." It is argued that the ensuing chaos mainly confused the enemy; the authors do not hesitate to revive the cultural revolution analogy of the monkey king who swung his massive cudgel and "everything under heaven seemed to be in chaos for a time."

Except for the necessary defense of the cultural revolution, the historical article is a rather moderate document, warning of impetuosity, especially on the left. The history makes a strong case against those who might think that such moderation would be opposed by Mao, pointing out that throughout the history of the party he has warned that in the context of a general tendency there are the seeds of opposing tendencies. Thus in the socialist revolution, "whenever our attacks on the bourgeoisie and our victories over them become the main trend, Chairman Mao invariably reiterates various proletarian policies and reminds us to remain prudent, help more people through education and narrow the target of attack, unite with all forces that can be united, and prevent and overcome the 'left' tendency running counter to these policies." A current leadership struggle against leftists who refuse to follow the Maoist zigzags is indicated as the article goes on to state: "When a certain tendency has developed to such an extent as to endanger the cause of the party, Chairman Mao always firmly steers the course for us with proletarian revolutionary fearlessness against the current."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S FRIENDS

8 JULY 1971

- 48 -

There are several historical references in the article which seem to bear on events of more recent vintage. Echoing lines from recent editorials and articles opposing "idealist apriorism," the article notes that various "sham Marxists" have "even pretended to be Marxist theoreticians, but only to bluff and hoodwink worker-peasant cadres and innocent young people." And the retelling of the errors of Wang Ming--who argued that right deviation remained the principal danger while pushing a line even more leftist than that which led to the downfall of Li Li-san, his predecessor--carries with it significant overtones in the light of Chen Po-ta's continued absence from the public scene.

PROVINCIAL RALLIES In a 2 July report, NCNA was at pains to specify that party organizations had conducted anniversary observances in all 29 provincial-level administrative units, but it did not mention any activities by provincial-level party organs or leaders. All monitorable provincial-level radios that are originating political materials, except for Heilungkiang,* reported on local festivities. In only a few cases, however, were top-level provincial figures reported present. The provincial first secretaries of Hopei, Shensi, and Hupeh attended local rallies, and ranking leaders of Tibet and Chekiang were present in their bailiwicks, according to local broadcasts.

* One of the four provinces that has not yet established its party committee. The others are Szechwan (which has still not resumed local broadcasting), Tibet, and Ningsia.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 49 -

U S S R - R O M A N I A

MOSCOW STRESSES BUCHAREST'S COMMITMENTS TO SOVIET BLOC

Moscow has used the occasion of the first anniversary of the Soviet-Romanian friendship treaty to lecture the Romanians on their treaty obligations and on the need for cohesion in the Soviet bloc, against the background of the public display of Sino-Romanian common interests during the Peking leg of Ceausescu's just concluded Asian tour. In a series of talks pegged to the anniversary in Moscow's Romanian service during the week prior to the 7 July anniversary, commentator Vladimir Ilyin underscored the role of the Soviet-Romanian treaty as part of the network of bilateral pacts which formed, together with the Warsaw Pact, "a wide unitary system of obligations of the socialist countries toward each other and toward the socialist community."

Ilyin's first talk, on 1 July, reminded Romanian listeners that the Soviet-Romanian treaty pledges both sides to strengthen their unity, "to consult each other regarding the most important problems of foreign policy, and to act entirely in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the Warsaw Treaty." The remark could be read as a low-keyed implication that if consorting with the Chinese did not violate the letter of these treaty obligations, it did contravene their "spirit." Ilyin went on to recall that the treaty also commits each party to come to the other's assistance if attacked by "any state or group of states"--a proviso ignored in Romanian comment on the conclusion of the treaty in July 1970, while Moscow played it up in broadcasts to China.

Ilyin went on to charge the "imperialists" with trying to undermine the socialist system by propagating the idea that the coordination of foreign policy among the socialist countries infringes on the individual countries' national sovereignty. Such allegations, he said, are designed "to promote nationalism and to weaken the cohesion and unity of the socialist peoples."

The second talk, on the 4th, focused on the need for closer economic cooperation within the Soviet bloc. Ilyin recalled Brezhnev's statement at the 24th CPSU Congress that "specialization and cooperation in production and the closer coordination of economic plans are imperative," as well as his remark that "it is necessary to march forward on the path of the economic integration of the socialist system."

CONFIDENTIAL

- 50 -

In his talk on the 6th, Ilyin played the theme that socialist internationalism is the only reliable basis for relations among the socialist countries, called for further "political, economic, and military cooperation" on this basis, and added: "The development of cooperation with the socialist countries in all spheres, the continual growth in the international influence of the socialist community as a closely united force was, is, and will remain the first concern of the USSR."

In a talk on the 7th, Ilyin commented that in concluding the Romanian-Soviet treaty the two sides pledged to "struggle for the improvement of the European political climate and for setting up an efficient security system on the continent; and they also pledged to act in accordance with the decisions taken within the Warsaw Pact and to develop economic cooperation within CEMA." Romania participated in the March 1969 Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee session that proposed a European security conference, and Bucharest has since been a foremost advocate of such a conference; but the tenor of its comment has reflected a hope that the proposed meeting might serve as a forum to mobilize noncommunist and communist support for Romania's independent line and underscore principles of sovereignty and noninterference.

IZVESTIYA ARGUES FOR "COORDINATED" BLOC FOREIGN POLICY

An article in the 3 July IZVESTIYA by Prof. Sh. Sanakoyev raises the issue of the internationalist duty of socialist countries to follow a coordinated foreign policy line in the interests of unity of the communist movement. The article's thrust seems aimed in part at the maverick Romanians. Sanakoyev argues that a coordinated line is "under present conditions the highest expression not only of the internationalist character of socialism's foreign policy, but also of the essential class nature of a socialist country's sovereignty" and constitutes "a splendid demonstration of the fraternal countries' readiness and ability to combine national and international interests correctly."

Advancing the stock Soviet formulation of the need for a united bloc policy--the ever-increasing "imperialist threat"--Sanakoyev cites the intervention in Czechoslovakia as an exemplary case of response to this danger and invokes the Brezhnev doctrine as the rationale for the Warsaw Five's action.

CONFIDENTIAL

8 JULY 1971

- 51 -

He goes on to update and underscore the Warsaw Pact's present role in formulating and implementing "a unified political line on questions of international relations," stating that the Pact has "become the main center for coordinating the fraternal countries' foreign policy activity."

As in the Ilyin commentaries in Romanian, Prof. Sanakoyev argues that such foreign policy coordination "not only does not infringe upon the independence and state sovereignty of any fraternal country, but on the contrary promotes the strengthening of each country's position and its opportunities for influencing the course and outcome of world events."

Maintaining that past coordination of foreign policy positions among the socialist countries has resulted in successes in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, Sanakoyev says "common positions" are "still of tremendous importance for averting the further exacerbation of the situation in the Near East." He adds that problems of European security "occupy a special place in the Warsaw Pact organization's activity," and he goes on argue the need for a united line on problems of disarmament and "in the formulation and discussion of multilateral treaties on these questions both within the UN framework and outside it."

CONFIDENTIAL

WARSAW PACT

MEDIA PUBLICIZE EXERCISES IN POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GDR

Routinely publicizing the spate of summer exercises of the Warsaw Pact forces, the Polish press agency reported on 26 June that "complex, multilevel staff exercises codenamed 'Summer-71' were held in the territory of Poland in June," involving mainly the staffs of the Polish and Soviet armies. The exercises were attended by new PZPR Secretary Stanislaw Kania, who has taken over the defense supervision functions formerly belonging to Moczar, and were commanded by Polish Defense Minister Jaruzelski.

Further staff exercises were held in the GDR and Czechoslovakia in the latter part of June: TASS on 2 July said that "exercises of operation headquarters of land-based troops, military air forces, and antiaircraft troops of the Warsaw Treaty member states were held between 24 June and 2 July on the territories of Czechoslovakia and the GDR." Pact Commander Yakubovskiy was in charge of these exercises, whose announced participants were the headquarters staffs of the Warsaw Pact and of the Czechoslovak, GDR, and Soviet armies.

Most recently, the Prague domestic service on 6 July reported the start of "allied exercises of the air force and antiaircraft defense forces" of the Soviet, Polish, and Czechoslovak armies, commanded by CSSR Defense Minister Dzur. All the exercises were described as taking place "according to the plan of the joint command." Communist media have yet to confirm a 7 July AFP report, attributed to the Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, that Warsaw Pact naval maneuvers are currently underway in the Skagerrak involving Soviet, Polish, and East German vessels.

A commentary in the unofficial Zagreb daily VJESNIK on 19 June had pointed with concern to unconfirmed rumors in the Western press about "preparation for large maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact forces, without the Romanian troops, on Hungarian territory near the Yugoslav border in the latter part of this month." The Yugoslav paper suggested that the rumors may have stemmed from "someone's malicious intention to introduce a bone of contention at a time when Moscow itself tolerates public statements by former Yugoslavs . . . about the deviation of this country from the right road--statements which we also heard two decades ago when this kind of twaddle formed a

CONFIDENTIAL
8 JULY 1971

- 53 -

component part of the Stalinist plans for our annihilation."* Such maneuvers, the paper said, would be "illogical" if the Soviet Union is serious about its peaceful initiatives in the international arena: "If the military exercises of a powerful Pact are really held on the border of a country which threatens no one, then the peace-loving initiatives are not what they claim to be."

* VJESNIK's allusion was to the alleged officially sanctioned activities of "Cominform emigres" from Yugoslavia in the Soviet Union calculated to denigrate the Tito regime during the current period of Yugoslav political turmoil. See the TRENDS of 9, 16, and 23 June 1971.

CONFIDENTIAL